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Abstract—Collaboration is at the heart of e-Science and e-
Research more generally. Successful collaborations must 
address both the needs of the end user researchers and the 
providers that make resources available. Usability and security 
are two fundamental requirements that are demanded by 
many collaborations and both concerns must be considered 
from both the researcher and resource provider perspective. In 
this paper we outline tools and methods developed at the 
National e-Science Centre (NeSC) that provide users with 
seamless, secure access to distributed resources through 
security-oriented research environments, whilst also allowing 
resource providers to define and enforce their own local access 
and usage policies through intuitive user interfaces. We 
describe these tools and illustrate their application in the 
ESRC-funded Data Management through e-Social Science 
(DAMES) and the JISC-funded SeeGEO projects. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is fairly common to stumble across stories of data 
compromise and outright carelessness with sensitive 
information in the national newspapers of most countries 
these days. More likely than not, the story will detail how a 
CD or laptop with the personal details (and in some cases, 
bank account numbers) of thousands of employees or 
citizens was either abandoned unprotected on public 
transport, or lost in transit by a courier. While the free 
movement of data is critical to nearly all business and 
research collaborations, controlling who gets this data, and 
what they can do with it once acquired, represents a major 
research challenge. 
There is a constant trade-off between security and 
usability in developing and supporting e-Infrastructures, 
especially those that provide access to federated data. On the 
one hand, the need for state-of-the-art middleware that gives 
collaborators the level of security they need is an 
unavoidable requirement. Yet this technology can be baffling 
for non-IT savvy end users who may not know what an 
X.509 digital certificate[1] is, let alone possess the critical 
know how to use it properly to access distributed resources. 
Many projects have adopted approaches based upon virtual 
research environments where portals are supported that 
provide a one-stop shop offering access to distributed 
information and services tailoured to the individual research 
domain. Whilst overcoming aspects of usability this model 
introduces other concerns including access control. Thus a 
remote provider, especially in more security-oriented 
domains not simply delegate access control completely to a 
remote portal. Rather they will still wish to remain 
autonomous and define their own access and usage policy 
when requests are received from the portal. This paper 
describes a security model and supporting set of tools being 
adopted across a wide range of UK e-Science projects at 
NeSC in the biomedical, geospatial and clinical domains. 
The focus of the model is the integration of complex 
middleware like Shibboleth[2], PERMIS[3], portals 
frameworks and the Globus Toolkit (globus.org), to support 
local site administrators, virtual organisation administrators 
and essentially, making the interaction of these technologies 
as transparent to the end user researchers as possible. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II 
provides an outline of the underlying technologies upon 
which the security-oriented tools have been developed. 
Section III describes the tools themselves and their 
functionality. Section IV describes the application of these 
tools to support different security-oriented application 
domains in the social/clinical sciences and in the 
social/geospatial sciences. 
II. UNDERLYING TECHNOLOGIES
Overcoming user issues in access to distributed resources 
is often achieved through development and support of 
portals. Whilst addressing user interface challenges, portals 
do not in themselves address all usability and security 
concerns. The notion of autonomy (where potentially 
remote sites can make their own authorisation decisions) 
and single sign-on (where users are not required to 
authenticate at each distributed resource) are two areas in 
particular that must be supported to support distributed
virtual research collaborations. 
A. Portals 
First, confirm Portals enable a service (or collection of 
services) to be accessed through a regular web browser. This 
is a major gain in usability as internet browsers are 
ubiquitous and thus familiar to all researchers. Instead of 
complicated command line switches and environments, users 
are presented with a project-tailored user interface that 
allows them to submit jobs or run queries by filling in forms 
or clicking buttons. The portal can also manage and 
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aggregate the results, and display them in a graph or output 
file.  
A portal is a container for hosting portlets, which are 
fragments of markup generated to allow access to an 
application across the internet. An application or service will 
typically be exposed by a single portlet, whereas if a project 
depends on several backend services, a portal can aggregate 
these services into a single page for the user. 
The JSR-168 specification[4] describes a framework for 
writing portlets which should be independent of the chosen 
portal framework, of which there are many to choose from. 
Apache Pluto runs a reference implementation of JSR-168, 
whereas other portal containers like GridSphere 
(gridsphere.org) contain custom tags intended to make 
programming the user interface easier. By sticking as close 
to JSR-168 as possible, portlets may be authored which can 
be deployed in any portal container.  
A recent extension to the specification, JSR-286, adds 
functionality for inter-portlet communication, plus defines 
some portlet security features which were once handled 
purely by the portal container. These new features are of 
particular interest to the projects described in this paper, and 
early adoption now may make the work we are doing fully 
transferrable to future portal frameworks with minimal re-
writes.  
Considering the portal model more generally, the 
migration of portal functionality into the JSR-286 portlet 
specification hints at a wider change towards portal 
technology being a client-side process which consumes 
remote portlets, rather than a service-side gateway into local 
portlets. For this reason, our portal tools have attempted to 
stick as close to the standards-based approach as much as 
possible, since portal framework technologies themselves 
tend to be fluid and subject to change/evolution.  
Another important point to be made here, concerns the 
famous 'n-tier'[5] problem, where the question of how to 
securely marry identities existing in separate security 
domains is important. To understand this, we need to look at 
federated authentication and Shibboleth, which at first glance 
appears to magnify the n-tier problem, but through use of 
other middleware can provide a solution. 
B. Shibboleth 
The Grid and recent incarnation to Cloud Computing 
presents a major user management challenge. In an 
environment which may comprise thousands of users from 
locations scattered around the globe, a simple Access 
Control List (ACL) can quickly become unmanageable. And 
even if management is possible, centralised user lists can 
only be accurate for a short period of time. Over longer 
spells, users may leave their respective institutions, 
privileges may be revoked - all of which mean central lists 
maintained by resource providers are no longer authoratative 
sources of user information.  
Consider the situation where a new member of staff or 
student begins work at a new university, company or other 
institution. Typically a student or member of staff will 
register in person with a registrar or human resources 
department, and this information will be used or delegated to 
create a campus identity for the user. If the user subsequently 
leaves the institution, through fair means or foul, the identity 
can be quickly disabled and the user's rights on campus will 
be revoked. The choice for user management therefore 
comes down to two options, either create a system of in-
person registration that can match the reliability of the 
institutional method, some of which may have been in place 
for centuries, or somehow leverage the information provided 
by the institution directly. The former is geographically and 
not financially viable for arbitrary systems, as it may involve 
great expense and travel to perform the face-to-face 
validations. The latter model is the focus of great effort in 
defining standards and protocols to achieve federated access 
management.    
Shibboleth[2] provides an architecture and protocols for 
transport of security information between institutions and 
providers. This security information is implemented in the 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), the first 
version of  which[6] is supported in the UK until 2010. This 
standard describes how information about the identity and 
privileges of users may be transported between services 
without compromising confidentiality or reliability. SAML 
describes specific entities within an organisation known as a 
federation, which is a collection of sites that have agreed to 
trust the information they give and receive. SAML defines 
an Identity Provider (IdP), which is a source of user 
information, and a Service Provider (SP) which is a 
consumer of user information. SAML also defines a core set 
of user attributes, which are extra pieces of information 
which may be used by an SP to make further access control 
decisions, e.g. based upon Role-Based Access Control 
(RBAC). Shibboleth also provides a single sign-on solution 
for portals, allowing a user to navigate between federation 
resources without having to input their credentials with each 
move. Or more precisely a user is able to access a Shibboleth 
protected portal/web resource, and if their privileges allow 
access other portal/web resources without the need for 
further re-authentication. 
In the UK, the UK Access Management Federation [7] 
performs the job of registering SPs and IdPs within the trust 
framework, and is responsible for publishing metadata 
giving a snapshot of all the trusting entities in the 
community. Using national-level federations makes 
configuration of Shibboleth a lot easier, as one of the hardest  
parts of installing Shibboleth is the creation of the metadata 
which describes how a system interacts with the others in the 
federation. It may become necessary soon to conduct 
investigations into integrating national federations to allow 
continental-scale access to services, an example being the 
EuroDSD project (www.eurodsd.eu) which provides data 
services for collaborators in seven countries across Europe. 
C. Shintau 
Shibboleth is a complex, but stable way to distribute 
reliable assertions that the person who is attempting to access 
a resource is the person they say they are. But this is only 
one half of the security story, as establishing a user's identity 
doesn't in itself tell you anything about that user's 
permissions on a resource. As mentioned above, SAML can 
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be used to also transmit user attributes for access control, 
which will tell the system what the user is allowed to do on 
that system. Currently, Shibboleth transports this information 
directly from the IdP in a signed assertion, meaning that the 
IdP needs to have all user attributes present either in the IdPs 
own database, or aggregated automatically by the IdP for this 
to be of any use. A user could feasibly accrue hundreds of 
attributes for access to remote services, which makes 
managing attributes at the IdP an administrative nightmare. 
Surveys [8] have looked into various ways in which access 
control via multiple Attribute Authorities may be achieved 
without compromising security or usability. 
Shintau [9] is a proposed extension to the Shibboleth 
infrastructure, where instead of user attributes being directly 
asserted by the IdP, they are aggregated by the user during 
the authentication process, and these attributes are asserted  
by the IdP on the user's behalf. This allows an IdP to remain 
an accountable source of user authentication, but the 
responsibility for collecting the correct attribute(s) required 
for access at the SP becomes the responsibility of the user. 
Shintau defines the concept of a SAML Linking Service 
(LS), where a user registers the remote IdPs (or Attribute 
Authorities) which they have registered with, and links it 
with their main IdP. When logging into their home IdP, the 
linking service automatically forwards the attributes from the 
remote IdPs and presents them within the main IdP's SAML 
attribute assertion. 
Whilst Shintau and Shibboleth can both be used for 
delivery of attribute information, ultimately a resource will 
itself need to use this information to make local authorisation 
decisions on access and usage. One way that this can be 
achieved is through the RBAC-based Privilege and Role 
Management Infrastructure Standards Validation (PERMIS) 
[3] technology. 
D. PERMIS 
PERMIS is a generic authorisation infrastructure which 
issues roles and privileges to users using X.509 Attribute 
Certificates. PERMIS provides a plug-in authorisation 
enforcement point (PEP), and tools with which to issue ACs 
and write local security policies. 
A security policy is a document written typically in XML 
which details the precise access control requirements of a 
resource. In PERMIS, policy definition and enforcement use 
an XML triple comprising a Role, a Action and an Target. 
For many purposes, the Role is contained within an X.509 
Attribute Certificate (AC)[10] which the user provides 
directly or through extraction of the Distinguished Name 
(DN) and subsequent LDAP lookup. The Target represents 
the URI of the Grid/Web service which the user is 
attempting to access, and the Action is the individual method 
that the user is attempting to invoke on this target. The XML 
policy dictates which combinations of Action and Target are 
permitted based on the Role that the user presents in their 
AC. Additional rules about which PKI keypairs are 
recognised by the PERMIS PEP, which certificate DNs are 
permitted and validity time can be expressed in the XML 
policy. All objects in PERMIS are digitally signed, ensuring 
the information hasn't been tampered with, and allowing the 
issuer of the certificate/policy to be confirmed. 
Direct usage of PERMIS is non-trivial and requires that 
someone at the resource provider becomes proficient at 
creating and managing Public Key Infrastructures (PKI), 
operation of LDAP servers, and then the PERMIS tools 
themselves (Attribute Certificate Manager, Policy Editor). 
One of the NeSC projects (SPAM-GP, described in section 
3) has provided some assistance in running this middleware, 
but the complexity of the surrounding infrastructure is one of 
the key issues with PERMIS. 
E. Globus Toolkit and MyProxy 
The Globus Toolkit is a suite of tools which enable Grids 
and especially computational Grids to be built. The suite 
consists of a vast array of open-source tools and applications, 
however these may be installed all as one package, or only 
parts of the kit may be installed depending on the 
application. For Grid Service security, Globus provides Grid 
Security  Infrastructure (GSI) tools that allow to pass user 
credentials on to services. Typically this is through creation 
and use of proxy certificates. Using the UK e-Science 
Certification Authority for these certificates provides 
compatability with UK Grid resources like the NGS. 
Utilising the MyProxy[11] tool, a degree of automation may 
be acheived with the handling of proxy certificates. 
Building upon these technologies we have focused upon 
developing tools that simplify the creation and use of user-
oriented, security-driven portal research environments. 
III. INTEGRATION TOOLS
The SPAM-GP project was commissioned by OMII-UK 
to provide a suite of tools to allow Shibboleth and portals to 
be integrated and configured. Three areas of infrastructure 
configuration were proposed and delivered, each providing a 
different level of security control. 
A. SCAMP 
A Shibboleth SP can receive SAML attributes from any 
IdP in the federation it subscribes to. The rules about what  
form of attributes may be accepted and which locations 
these attributes may originate from is expressed by the 
Attribute Acceptance Policy (AAP). This is an XML 
document which must be edited by hand to reflect the 
desired security rules. Editing raw XML can be daunting at 
the best of times, but when this policy expresses access 
control rules, then extra care must be taken to ensure that 
the edited policy does not compromise the security of the 
resource. The default AAP which ships with Shibboleth has 
fairly lax rules in place which should be edited prior to first 
deployment. 
        The Scoped Attribute Manager Portlet (SCAMP) is a 
JSR-168 compliant portlet which allows the Shibboleth 
AAP to be edited correctly. The portlet reads in 
configuration files from the Shibboleth installation, building 
a list of the federation IdPs and the current state of the AAP. 
The portal administrator is then presented with the current 
policy in a JSP page, which may be added to or edited as the 
421
Authorized licensed use limited to: UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW. Downloaded on November 3, 2009 at 07:41 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
resource requires, safe in the knowledge that the XML 
produced will be valid. Since the Shibboleth AAP dictates 
the attribute set that every service on the resource will see, 
the tool is intended to be used by resource owners only, so 
the tool is normally deployed in the portal container so it 
can only be accessed by the portal adminstrator. 
B. ACP 
The PERMIS infrastructure provides several tools for 
issuing ACs, which normally run as seperate components 
invoked from the command line. The Attribute Certificate 
Portlet (ACP) is a JSR-168 compliant portlet that can be 
deployed in the portal along with other application specific 
portlets (interfaces to services). The ACP allows a 
privileged user to issue X.509 ACs for access to potentially 
remote backend services. The roles that may populate the 
issued AC may be completely user-defined, or they may be 
restricted to particular attributes which have been asserted 
by Shibboleth. Provided the PKI Source-of-Authority is 
recognised by the PERMIS policy of external services, these 
ACs may be used to enforce RBAC. 
C. ACP 
The Content Configuration Portlet (CCP) is an extension 
to the GridSphere framework which provides an additional 
login module that can build user login sessions from 
information provided by Shibboleth via SAML. Since this 
module makes changes to the core framework, it can't really 
be published as a JSR-168 compliant portlet. The CCP is 
based on the MAMS Shibbolized GridSphere model[12], 
but with extensions to allow any asserted SAML attribute to 
be utilised for access control, and stored in the GridSphere 
user/role database. 
Other portal frameworks such as Sakai and LifeRay 
support functionality similar to CCP. The Sakai workspace 
concept for example allows to define new user groups that 
users can be mapped to when they log in to the portal. 
Indeed GridSphere also supports this, however the roles and 
groups are very limited (admin, guest etc). 
To understand how these portlets and the underlying 
technologies can be used to support security-oriented 
collaborations we describe their application in two projects: 
SEE-GEO and DAMES. 
IV. APPLICATIONS
A. SEE-GEO 
The Secure access to Geospatial Services (SEE-GEO), 
funded under the JISC Grid OGC Collision programme, 
aimed to investigate how to make geospatial data accessible 
utilising 'Grid' technologies. The project produced a 
GridSphere portal-based linking service, joining geospatial 
boundary data hosted at EDINA (edina.ac.uk) with census 
data sets provided by MIMAS (mimas.ac.uk). Both of these 
data sets have security requirements associated with them, 
e.g. the EDINA data comes from Ordnance Survey and thus 
has strict licensing terms and conditions which users must 
abide by. NeSC was tasked with implementing the associated 
security infrastructure and and demonstrating practise in how 
to secure these types of data in the future.  
One of the challenges in building security onto existing 
data services is the fact that these resources usually have 
their own completely customised authorisation requirements. 
A centre hosting a production-level data service will 
typically not be a willing candidate to deploy and test new 
middleware, no matter how much these tools meet their own 
requirements. They are by nature conservative and are tasked 
at support production level services to user communities. 
With this in mind, the focus of the project was on delivering 
an accessor service to the EDINA-hosted Web Feature Set 
(WFS) [13] service. This was written in Java and deployed 
using Globus Toolkit 4, offering method-level access to three 
different geographical feature sets (England 1910, England 
2001, Scotland 2001). The accessor service was designed to 
be as lightweight as possible. The service itself supported 
several methods which were protected, i.e. required 
authorisation. These methods receive queries generated by a 
portal, and if sufficient authorisation information was 
provided, they would subsequently allow access to each 
individual feature set. PERMIS is well suited to protecting 
methods of a GT4 service, so the authorisation for the 
accessor service was tailored to require that the user hold a 
valid X.509 AC containing the correct role for that specific 
data set to be visible. 
Figure 1 shows the interactions of the services in SEE-
GEO. A WFS rendering portlet was deployed in GridSphere, 
to which access was restricted via the SCAMP tool to only 
access attributes of types wfs. The CCP was used to restrict 
the portlet view to only those people holding that attribute. 
The portal administrator was given access (through CCP) to 
the ACP which was used to issue the necessary ACs required 
to query the WFS service. Based on the feature set selected 
by the user, a GSI call to the accessor service was made, 
using a proxy credential loaded by the user. PERMIS utilised 
the DN of this certificate to successfully retrieve the correct 
AC issued for the user by the administrator. Based on this 
AC, access was either denied, or if allowed, the method was 
invoked, the query executed and data returned. 
Figure 1: The GT4 'Accessor Service' model (marked by 
PEP) adopted for the SEE-GEO project. SPAM-GP 
tools are in green. 
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Since the accessor service is itself independent of 
location, it was possible for development of the accessor 
service to take place without disruption to the production 
service. Ideally the accessor service would be deployed at the 
data service location, acting as a secure gateway to the data. 
In fact, it should always be the case that the responsibility for 
defining the access policy, deploying the service, and issuing 
the required credentials is performed by the resource 
providers. In this work the GT4 service was itself hosted at 
NeSC in Glasgow. It is hoped the work done in 
implementing this demonstrator will encourage data 
providers to adopt a more generic standard that sacrifices 
none of their security needs, but allows a much more 
distributed and automated level of access. 
One aspect of this case study was understanding how 
user identities are propagated and confirmed through n-tier 
systems. The accessor service identifies users by the proxy 
certificate that is presented by GSI, the DN of which is 
extracted to allow PERMIS to locate the correct ACs for the 
user. The question of how this proxy credential is generated 
with no user input is still an open one. We currently use a 
MyProxy server to which we have designed a portal interface 
that allows a user to load and issue themselves (with 
interaction) with a proxy certificate based on their UK e-
Science X.509 credential. Although this method works and is 
secure, it is by no means a standards-based approach, and 
better methods based on MyProxy could be envisaged. For 
example, a MyProxy server that is able to consume valid 
SAML assertions to issue proxy certs in real time is one 
possibility. Other methods include a MyProxy IdP which 
could pass proxy certificates along with the Shintau-
aggragated attribute set, or utilisation of the future SAML 
Holder-of-key profile (possibly consumed by MyProxy). 
B. DAMES 
The ESRC-funded Data Management through e-Social 
Science (DAMES) project is a three-year project looking at 
data management activities relating to occupation, education, 
ethnicity and clinical/e-Health and wider social care data 
sets. Data management challenges faced in the social 
sciences are numerous: investigation of trends in data over 
decades (longitudinal studies) where different coding 
systems and classifications and categorizations are used, e.g. 
regional boundaries of local authorities change over time and 
understanding this when dealing with changing population 
dynamics or the change/impact upon health policy is 
essential to guide policy or understand research questions 
impacting upon society more generally. 
In DAMES, NeSC has been extending the model 
developed in SEE-GEO to provide linkage into live Census 
data hosted by MIMAS and linkage with other clinical 
resources, specifically to understand research into self-harm 
and depression. When a user wishes to gain access to any 
census data sets, they visit the Census Registration Service 
hosted at the University of Essex, and make an online 
declaration for each data set that they will abide by the terms 
and conditions for access. Once approved, the user is taken 
to an online Census Service (casweb.mimas.ac.uk) where the 
user can subsequently download the census data of interest. 
These interactions are done via Shibboleth inside web 
browsers. One of the challenges with regard to security and 
dealing with access to distributed data however, is that there 
is no programmatic API or service through which the Census 
data can be accessed. Rather it is a web form that a user is 
offered for direct data download. Ideally for authorised 
access, a service should be defined through which access 
control should be enforced. 
In the first instance we have directly downloaded the 
Census data to NeSC in Glasgow. A GT4 service has been 
implemented that has security (authorisation) requirements 
that must be fulfilled before this data can be accessed. We 
have developed two specific portlets that provide different 
query interfaces to this Census data. These allow researchers 
to select subsets of the Census variables related to health and 
well-being. 
In addition to Census data, the researchers we work with 
also require seamless access to clinical data. The Scottish 
Morbidity Records cover clinical data from over 30-years 
across Scotland. This includes all hospital admissions 
(SMR01), mental health/psychosis (SMR04), cancer 
registrations (SMR06) and death registrations (SMR99). It is 
planned through the recently funded Scottish Health 
Informatics Platform for Research (SHIP) project 
(www.scot-hip.org.uk), that we will have direct access to 
these data sets hosted by the NHS. However, until now we 
have been given a pseudonymised subset of these data sets 
(apprx. 4 million records in total) that allow for basic data 
explorations and linkage to be supported. For these different 
services we have developed GT4 services that require 
authorisation. 
Given that the Census have established a user registration 
list of who has registered for which particular data sets we 
would like to leverage these efforts, since ultimately they are 
the source of authority of who has/has not signed up to 
which license conditions on which data. A proposed 
architecture for this is shown in Figure 2.  We note how the 
fine-grained user attributes are only transmitted between the  
data source and the registration service, and also how the 
registration service may require the DN of the user's X.509 
certificate to make the link when the portal makes a request 
to the PERMIS-protected census data service. 
Figure 2: The Accessor Service model proposed for 
DAMES, showing interaction with exisiting Registration 
Service. 
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We note that we have also investigated several newer 
portal frameworks, including Sakai and Liferay, but our 
focus is on portal-independence, and indeed some of our 
services may utilise non-portal based access via WebDAV 
and iRODS. 
V. CONCLUSIONS
A security model for federated data services has been 
demonstrated conceptually, and in practise, as a possible 
generic solution for robust access control. The model 
assumes a federated authentication system based on 
Shibboleth, with extra user information delivered through 
Shibboleth from remote IdPs. We are also working on 
exploitation of aggregated ACs from several attribute 
authorities using the Shintau Linking Service acting on 
behalf of the user.  
The SPAM-GP project has implemented administrator 
tools at the portal level to control the user environment based 
on their held privileges, and also a tool to allow signed 
X.509 credentials to be used for final fine-grained access 
control to the constituent back-end services. The SEE-GEO 
project has demonstrated that PERMIS can be used to protect 
a GT4 accessor service which acts as a proxy to the data 
source that can enforce access control via PERMIS. The 
adoption of standards-based solutions for each technology 
challenge (SAML, X.509, JSR-168/286) ensures broad 
coverage of most scenarios, and a degree of future-proofing 
not possible with the many bespoke solutions on offer today. 
Once the final challenge of the secure generation of X.509 
proxy certificates for users has been met, we believe this 
framework offers a scalable method to enforce multi-layered 
security across administrative and organisational domains. 
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